Zero Hedge: Li(e)bor – The Cartel Emerges

HJ: Another excellent article from Tyler Durden over at Zero Hedge.  His impeccable research brings us another expose on the true extent of the collusion between banks and traders in the ongoing LIBOR scandal.  This latest report is based around an article from Der Spiegel, a prominent, respected and widely-read magazine in Germany.  It is the German equivalent of the Economist, to make an analogy and give you an idea of the importance and significance of them breaking a story such as this.  - Truth

By Tyler Durden on 08/01/2012 11:37 -0400

Zero Hedge

Just when you thought the Li(e)bor scandal had jumped the shark, Germany’s Spiegel brings it back front-and-center with a detailed and critical insight into the ‘organized fraud’ and emergence of the cartel of ‘bottom of the food chain’ money market traders. “The trick is that you can’t do it alone” one of the ‘chosen’ pointed out, but regulators have noiw spoken “mechanisms are now taking effect that I only knew of from mafia films.” RICO anyone? ”This is a real zinger,” says an insider. In the past, bank manager lapses resulted from their stupidity for having bought securities without understanding them. “Now that was bad enough. But manipulating a market rate is criminal.” A portion of the industry, adds the insider, apparently doesn’t realize that the writing is on the wall.

There have been plenty of banking scandals, but none quite like this: Investigators and political leaders believe that the manipulation of the Libor benchmark interest rate was the result of organized fraud. Institutions that participated could face billions in fines and penalties.

SPIEGEL: The Cartel Emerges

In 2005, a young trader with Moroccan roots came to Barclays: Philippe Moryoussef, who is now 44… Moryoussef traded in interest rate derivatives during his time at Barclays. He and his fellow traders knew exactly how much money they stood to lose or gain if the Libor or Euribor changed by only a fraction of a percentage point in one direction or the other.

And they apparently did everything they could to eliminate happenstance. Moryoussef communicated by phone or email with colleagues inside and outside the bank almost daily to steer interest rates in the right direction. To do so, they sent inquiries to the people who were responsible for inputting the Libor rates: the money market traders.

In the glitzy world of investment banking, money market traders were at the bottom of the pecking order before the financial crisis. They were not involved in major deals, and they could only dream of the kinds of bonuses stock and bond traders received. “They were always at the bottom of the food chain,” says a former investment banker.

It was a conspiratorial group of underdogs who worked for various banks and met at least once a month for a beer or a mojito in New York, London or Frankfurt. By the middle of the last decade, when there seemed to be a surplus of money at the banks, they all had the same problem: They were derided or, worse yet, ignored by their colleagues in the trading rooms of major banks.

But what if it were possible to know where interest rates were headed at the end of the day, or even in the next hour? What if a few traders could manipulate the ups and downs of interest rates?

By 2005 at the latest, the traders would seem to have begun realizing just how much power they had were they able to collaborate within their small group. There was no need for formal contracts between large institutions, merely agreements among friends. A pointer here, a few traders meeting for lunch there, and soon the group had formed a global cartel that, according to investigators, reached from Japan to Europe to Canada.

“Come on over; I’ll open a bottle of Bollinger,” a trader, inebriated with his success, wrote to a colleague after the Libor rate had been set. Adair Turner of the British regulatory agency quotes the email as evidence of “a culture of cynical greed in the trading rooms.”

The Organized Fraud

“If the rate remains unchanged, I’m a dead man,” a trader emailed to a colleague who was responsible for Libor in October 2006. The traders sent at least 173 inquiries of this nature between 2005 and May 2009 for the dollar Libor alone. They were often successful.

“The trick is that you can’t do it alone,” he bragged to outside colleagues at HSBC, Société Générale and Deutsche Bank, who allegedly cooperated with him.

Read the rest of the article here: Zero Hedge


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